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Beyond　Mass　Production：　The　Development
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Japanese　System
　　　　　　Martin　Kenney
（Professor，　Univ．　of　California）
　　　　During　the　last　decade　there　has　been　increasing　interest　in　the　origins　and　the
development　of　the　Japanese　production　system　（JPS）．　This　article　briefly　outlines　my
theory　of　the　origins　and　development　of　the　JPS．　Earlier　theories　regarding　the　JPS
can　be　divided　into　three　general　categories．　The　first　category　thought　that　the　JPS
was　underdeveloped　and　as　the　country　became　more　prosperous　it　would　converge　on
a　Western　type　model．　The　second　category　believed　that　the　basis　of　JPS　was　the
superexploitation　of　workers　and　supplier　firms　and　as　such　had　no　relevance　to　other
countries，　The　final　category　held　that　the　JPS　was　an　outgrowth　of　the　unique
Japanese　culture　based　on　rice　cultivation　and　the　Confucian　way　of　life．　These
scholars　believed　that　the　roots　of　the　JPS　were　centuries　old．
　　　Understanding　of　the　JPS　requires　aR　examination　of　the　fol！owing　two　features：
the　intemal　labor－rnanagement　relationships　and　the　relationships　between　firms．
The　structures　on　both　re！ationships　were　drastically　reorganized　in　£he　Post　World
War　Two　period．　This　discussion　describes　the　emergence　of　the　current　labor－
management　relationships　and　then　turns　briefly　to　the　supplier　relationships　that
have　developed　in　Japanese　industry．
　　Labor－Management　RelatioRs
　　　In　the　immediate　postwar　reriod　Japan　experienced　near－total　economic　collapse．
Simultaneously，　there　was　extremely　rapid　unionization　accompanied，　sometimes，
worker　tak’?ｏｖｅｒ　and　operation　of　entire　factories．　Also，　the　U．　S．　GHQ　purged　leading
industrialists　and　divided　the　zaibatsu　firms．　ln　i950　the　influence　of　the　growing　Cold
War　and　the　conflict　in　Korea　prepared　the　groundwork　for　a　counteroffensive　by　busi－
ness　aimed　at　purging　radicals　from　the　work　force．　This　offensive　succeeded；　in　its
wake　a　new　labor－management　structure　was　created　whose　features　included：
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10ng－term　employment　for　regular　workers，　wages　with　a　significant　seniority　compo－
nent，　enterprise　unions　and　a　blurred　division　between　blue－collar　and　white－col！ar
employees．　Many　Western　scholars　mistake　this　arrangement　for　“paternalism，”
because　they　do　not　understand　its　historical　roots．
　　　This　labor－maRage］nent　structure　created　a　quite　different　context　for　the　evolu－
tion　of　the　Japanese　industrial　system．　For　example，　in　the　U．　S．　workers　organized
into　industrial　unions．　Work　was　characterized　by　functional　specia！ization，　a　strict
separation　between　management　and　workers　and　a　job－linked　compensation　system．
The　Japanese　system　of　long－term　employment　meant　that　the　firm　captured　the
returns　for　training　investments，　thus　providing　much　greater　incentive　for　training．
Japanese　workers　received　emp！oyment　security　but　did　not　have　a　job－Linked　com－
pensation　system，　this　provided　management　great　flexibility　in　deployiRg　workers　in
constantly　changing　configurations．　The　organization　of　work　was　on　a　team　basis．　ln
contrast，　U．　S．　maRagement　and　engineers　retained　full　responsibility　for　quality，
machine　maintenance　and　production　improvement．　ln　Japan　workers　dischayged
many　of　these　duties．　The　Japanese　system　emphasized　worker　invo！vement　and
especially　the　capabilities　of　the　workers　to　contribute　to　the　improvement　of　the
production　process．
　　　The　Japanese　system　evolved　into　what　some　scholars　term　the　“learning　factory．”
For　Japanese　firms　the　factory　is　more　than　just　a　production　location．　lt　is　an　institu－
tion　that　not　on！y　produces，　but　is　constantly　learning　to　improve　production．　ln　this
sense，　the　factory　resembles　a　laboratory　that　is　experimenting　and　searching　for
better　production　methods．　Western　business　treated　the　factory　as　finely　tuned
machine　that，　once　designed　and　established，　need　only　be　kept　running　smoothly．　The
Japanese　saw　the　factory　more　as　an　organism　made　up　of　living　parts，　so　it　was
fluid，　constantly　evolving　and　improving．
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　Interfirm　RelatioRs
　　　Interfirm　relationships　in　Japan　also　evolved　quite　differently　from　the　U．　S．
In　the　U．　S．　large　firms　like　General　Motors　developed　two　strategies　for　parts
and　components　acquisition．　For　important　parts　assemblers　simply　purchased　the
parts　supplier　and　integrated　it　as　a　sub．sidiary．　The　other　payts　were　purchased
through　market　transactionS　based　on　bidding．　This　became　the　basis　of　Coase　and
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Williamson’s　dichotomous　distinction　between　“market’　and　hierarchy．”　Whereas，　U．
S．　economists　believed　either　markets　or　hierarchies　were　the　only　ways　to　arrange
supplier－assembler　relationships，　Japanese　industry　developed　quite　different　inter－
firm　relationship　patterns．
　　　　k　is　difficult　to　identify　exactly　when　the　current　pattern　of　Japanese　assem－
bler－supplier　relations　was　established．　According　to　Takahiro　Fujimoto　in　the　pre－
war　period　there　were　some　“black　box”　relationships，　but　these　were　not　prevalent
throughout　industry．　However，　in　the　postwar　period　close　1ong－term　relationships
between　assemblers　and　suppliers　developed　in　many　industries．　ln　these　relationships
the　assemblers　often　depend　upon　specialist　suppliers　to　develop　parts　for　their　new
products．　ln　contrast　to　the　U．　S．一style　open　bidding　system，　Japanese　assemblers　and
suppliers　share　information　before　the　actual　purchase　contract　signing．
　　　The　key　advantage　of　the　Japanese　system　is　that　it　transcends　the　market　or
hierarchy　problem　by　communication　and　an　emphasis　on　the　long－term　nature　of　in－
terfirm　relations．　The　drawbacks　of　the　pure　market　transactions　are　that　the　infor－
mation　communicated　is　limited　to　price　and　specifications．　Often，　the　assembler　is
subject　to　opportunistic　behavior　by　the　supplier．　For　the　assembler　the　incentive　is　io
drive　price　down　without　regard　to　the　survival　of　the　supp｝ier．　On　the　other　hand，
with　internalization　the　supplier　firm　is　no　longer　subject　to　survival　pressure　and　can
lose　its　ability　tQ　collect　information　from　the　marketplace．　The　result　often　is　ineffi－
ciency　and　an　inability　to　develop・innovative　technology　of　its　own　due　to　its　fobus
on　its　single　customer．　The　entire　system　severely　limits　information　flow．　This　can
contribute　to　a　deterioration　of　the　entire　production　infrastructure．　And，　this　is
exactly　what　happened　to　the　U．　S．　supplier　base．
　　Conclusion
　　　Japan　developed　a　sophisticated　and　advanced　industrial　system　for　the　production
of　manufactured　goods．　The　labor－management　system　emphasized　learning　and　con－
tinuous　improvement．　Similarly，　supplier　relations　encouraged　suppliers　to　constantly
decrease　costs　and　improve　products　and　production　processes．　As　a　result，　in　manu－
factured　goods　the　JPS　has　become　a　model　for　all　countries．　Many　countries　are
seeking　to　adopt　Japanese　techniques　either　through　Japanese　transplants　or　a
“Japanization”　of　home　couhtry　firms．
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　　　And　yet，　today　the　JPS　confronts　dilemmas　caused　by　its　own　success．　First，　the
increasing　value　of　the　yen　makes　export　from　Japan　more　difficu！t．　ln　response，
many　Japanese　assemblers　and　suppliers　are　establishing　overseas　facilities．　This　has
two　important　effects：　lt　decreases　the　need　for　JapaRese　manufacturing　employment
and　increases　pressure　to　abandon　£he　loRg－term　employment　system．　Also，　moviRg
production　facilities　offshore　weakens　longstanding　relationships　with　suppliers，　as
there　is　insufficient　demand．　The　suppliers　must　also　either　move　offshore　or　face　a
smaller　market　in　Japan．　This　so－called　“hollowing－out”　phenomenon　may　become
an　intractable　problem　in　the　future．
　　　The　secoBd　dilemma　for　Japanese　industry　is　that　the　establishment　of　many　over－
seas　factories　means　that　these　firms　must　manage　non－Japanese　employees　and　buy
parts　from　non－Japanese　firms．　Will　foreign　employees　and　suppliers　be　integrated
into　the　Japanese　model　or　will　they　remain　simply　overseas　“hands”　unable　to
contribute　the　firm’s　overall　mission？　The　answer　to　this　question　will　decide
whether　Japanese　firms　become　Japanese　fiyms　with　overseas　operations　or　global
firms．　Japanese　firms　must　decide　what　is　the　essence　of　Japanese．　management　that
is　applicable　globally．
